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ABSTRACT This paper discusses the development and implementation of the architecture of a Framework
for Aerospace Vehicle Reasoning, ‘FAVER’. Integrated Vehicle Health Management systems require a
holistic view of the aircraft to isolate faults cascading between aircraft systems. FAVER is a system-agnostic
framework developed to isolate such propagating faults by incorporating Digital Twins (DTs) and reasoning
techniques. The flexibility of FAVER to work with different types and scales of DTs and diagnostics, and
its ability to adapt and expand for previously unknown faults and new systems are demonstrated in this
paper. The paper also shows the novel combination of relationship matrix and fault attributes database
used to structure the knowledge of FAVER’s expert system. The paper provides the working mechanism of
FAVER’s reasoning and its ability to isolate faults at the system level, identify their root causes, and predict
the cascading effects at the vehicle level. Four aircraft systems are used for demonstration purposes: i) the
Electrical Power System, ii) the Fuel System, iii) the Engine, and iv) the Environmental Control System, and
the use case scenarios are adapted from real aircraft incidents. The paper also discusses the pros and cons
of FAVER’s reasoning via demonstrations and evaluates the performance of FAVER’s reasoning through a
comparative study with a supervised neural network model.
INDEX TERMS Reasoning, health monitoring, aircraft systems, cascading faults, aircraft accidents, OSA-
CBM.
I. INTRODUCTION
Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) is an evolv-
ing capability that enables the Condition Based Mainte-
nance (CBM) of complex vehicles like aircraft. It uses data
from various sources such as sensors, maintenance records,
and design documents to condition monitoring, diagnosing
faults and degradations, and evaluating the remaining useful
life of the concerned systems [1]. For an aircraft, the main
objective of IVHM is to enable the vehicle to function as
intended, increasing its reliability and availability, and saving
time and cost associated with unexpected downtime and the
eventual consequence of prolonged maintenance activities.
IVHM aims to be a part of the aircraft’s end-to-end process,
starting from design requirements leading up to after-sales
service, rather than being an add-on service to an already
mature process [1].
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Zhaojun Li .
Across the aircraft industry, IVHM has focused mainly
on health monitoring at the component, Line Replaceable
Unit (LRU), and system levels. For example, the state-of-the-
art IVHM system in the Boeing 777, Aircraft Diagnostics
and Maintenance Systems (ADMS) is capable of isolat-
ing cascading faults caused due to interaction between the
components [2]. Honeywell’s Health and Usage Monitoring
System (HUMS) uses sensors to monitor mission-critical
components like the engine compressor, the engine accessory
gearbox, and the drive trains in order to isolate mechan-
ical faults and prevent catastrophic failures [3]. Similarly,
other original equipment manufacturers such as Safran and
Meggitt provide Engine Monitoring Units for aircraft and
HUMS for helicopters [4]–[7], while consultancies like
Infosys provide landing gear health monitoring solutions [8].
TEAMS-Remote Diagnostic Server (RDS), a COTS prod-
uct provided by Qualtech System Inc., focuses on systems
level health monitoring and was developed to remotely mon-
itor and diagnose International Space Station. It uses sensor
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data, equipment and field data and diagnoses multiple faults
present in the systems. TEAMS-RDS uses a cause-effect
approach to diagnose faults, and it helps in real time and
proactive monitoring of the systems, along with troubleshoot-
ing. Its real-time embedded reasoner named TEAMS-RT,
uses matrices of onboard tests and equipment failures to
isolate root causes of the faults in target systems. These
results are ideally suited for Integrated Health Management
applications. TEAMS-RDS can be applied in aircraft, ships,
and automobiles [9], [10]. On the other hand, methods like
distributed diagnosis and timed failure propagation graphs
are used to demonstrate failure propagation into surrounding
areas in HVAC systems [11] and power distribution sys-
tems [12] and in fuel systems [13].
With the trend of increasingly integrated systems in the
aircraft industry, like more-electric and all-electric aircraft,
the complexity of interaction between the aircraft systems
is rising. This has resulted in the necessity for monitoring
aircraft systems’ health, not just ‘within the systems’ but also
‘across the systems’, i.e., at the vehicle level [2]. Further-
more, fault propagation from one aircraft system to another
has become more frequent due to the increased interactions
between the aircraft systems. While it is usually addressed
during maintenance, if a fault takes an unexpected propaga-
tion path, its cascading effects are difficult to troubleshoot.
Several aircraft accidents have occurred due to faults from
one aircraft system affecting other interacting systems. One
such example is the engine rollback incident of a British
Airways B777-200 ER in 2008, which resulted in the air-
craft touching down 300m short of the runway at London’s
Heathrow airport. The rollback was due to restricted fuel
flow to the engines, caused by ice blocking the fuel-oil heat
exchanger [14]. A similar incident had taken place in Mon-
tana, with Delta Airlines B777-200 ER in 2008, resulting in
an emergency descent from 39000ft to 31000ft [15]. Another
example is the emergency evacuation of a Fokker F28 in
2002, caused by a small crack in the compressor blade of the
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU). The debris from the compressor
blade was ingested in the gas path, cracking an oil seal and
allowing oil spray to be released in the bleed valve, and
eventually generating smoke in the cabin [16]. Such unex-
pected fault propagation paths lead to unplanned downtime
costing the airlines time and reputation. Troubleshooting and
isolating these cascading faults requires a holistic view of
the aircraft considering the interactions between its various
systems, i.e. vehicle level health monitoring.
Only a few research works consider subsystems/systems
interactions at the vehicle level [2]. A vehicle health monitor-
ing system architecture patented by Honeywell employed a
decision support system that would ignore a fault from an air-
craft system, like the Environmental Control System (ECS),
if there was a possibility that the said fault could have been
caused by the system it interacts with, like the engine [17].
Similarly, Airbus Defense and Space demonstrated the effect
of a fault in a fuel-cooled oil cooler on other independent
systems using a modular framework that employed Bayesian
Networks for reasoning [18]. These examples of IVHM sys-
tems show that the area of vehicle level health monitoring
is still underexplored. Moreover, many studies carried out
at the vehicle level have a centralised architecture [8], [27],
which might pose a problem of scalability at the later stage.
To address this gap of diagnosing cascading faults at the
vehicle level, a modular framework titled a Framework for
Aerospace Vehicle Reasoning (FAVER) that combines Digi-
tal Twin (DT) and reasoning has been proposed [28].
This paper explains how FAVER’s architecture, influenced
by the Open Standard Architecture for Condition Based
Maintenance (OSA-CBM), is developed and how it explores
vehicle level health monitoring for the aircraft by employing
reasoning and digital twins. To that effect, Section I shows the
need for vehicle level health monitoring in IVHM systems by
presenting the aircraft accident scenarios and state-of-the-art
IVHM systems in the industry. Section II provides FAVER’s
general schematic, objectives, and related works to set up the
framework. Section III presents the architecture of FAVER
and demonstrates the two important properties of FAVER:
its scalability and flexibility. In section IV, the objectives
of FAVER to isolate root causes of single and interaction
faults in newly added systems, and to resolve ambiguities, are
demonstrated with examples of fault propagation involving
four aircraft systems akin to real aircraft incidents. Section V
presents the pros and cons of FAVER’s reasoning using a few
use cases and evaluates the performance of FAVER’s reason-
ing by carrying out a comparative study with neural networks.
Section VI summarises the paper and provides some ideas for
the future development of FAVER.
II. FAVER – THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The framework of FAVER has been proposed to isolate cas-
cading faults or degradations that originate in one system
and affect another system in an aircraft [19]. FAVER consists
of two essential parts: i) Reasoning and ii) a Digital Twin
(DT). The reasoning component is employed by FAVER to
reason through the health information from various aircraft
systems in order to set priorities and pass judgments as to
which system is the root cause of the concerned fault and
which are the affected systems. The Digital Twin (DT) is
a virtual representation of any physical asset [1], and it is
used by FAVER to emulate the interaction between the air-
craft systems, to produce ‘what-if’ simulations to explore the
unexpected scenarios in advance, and to validate the results
produced by the reasoning component. FAVER is one of
the first frameworks to combine the versatility of DT with
the power of reasoning to isolate cascading faults at the
vehicle level. Fig.1 shows the general working schematic of
FAVER [20], consisting of four layers, influenced by OSA-
CBM. OSA-CBM implements ISO 13374 Condition Moni-
toring and Diagnostics of Machines [21] to define an open
standard for distributed CBM. It is currently maintained by
Machine Information Management Open Systems Alliance
(MIMOSA). OSA-CBM is defined using Unified Modelling
Language (UML) and is platform independent. It enables
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FIGURE 1. Working schematic of FAVER influenced by OSA-CBM framework.
processing of multiple types of information without involving
technical interfaces. OSA-CBM consists of six layers: i) Data
Acquisition, ii) Data Manipulation, iii) State Detection, iv)
Health Assessment, v) Prognosis Assessment, and vi) Advi-
sory Generation [22]. The FAVER framework is developed
in parallel to the layers defined in OSA-CBM. The DT layer,
the bottom row of FAVER in fig. 1, consists of the aircraft
systems considered in the framework. This layer is used to
acquire health data from different representations of aircraft
systems. The next two rows cover the system level diagnostics
and fault modes for each of the aircraft system DTs. Data
collected from the DT layer for both healthy and fault modes
is manipulated and health information is extracted. These
are used to develop diagnostics for each aircraft systems,
in parallel to the State Detection and Health Assessment
layers of OSA-CBM. Considering the bottom three layers of
FAVER vertically for each system would be the classical way
of conducting aircraft system diagnostics, with each system
being stove-piped. The final layer, the top row, is the reason-
ing layer that connects all the verticals, using the symptom
vector (sensor readings of selected parameters representing
the health of each system) as input. This layer enables fault
isolation, including interacting faults at the vehicle level, and
carries out qualitative prognosis to predict the effects of these
faults over the aircraft systems in the interaction network,
providing advisories regarding the potential root causes and
cascading effects at the vehicle level. Fig.1 shows four aircraft
systems comprising the interaction network: the Electrical
Power System (EPS), the Fuel System (FS), the engine, and
the Environmental Control System (ECS). Each of these
aircraft systems has its own representative DT, simulating
its system level operations along with the (macro) vehicle
level interactions shown in fig.1. The FS provides fuel to the
engine, the engine supplies bleed air to the ECS and shaft
power to the EPS, and the EPS provides electricity to all the
other systems in the framework. These high level interactions
are treated as input/output for each DT. The system level
diagnostics can isolate a certain number of fault modes, which
consist of faults with local effects (micro, within the system),
as well as interacting effects (macro, propagating to other
systems). The sensor data from each system is combined to
form the symptom vector, which, along with the results from
the four system level diagnostics, is input to the top level for
further reasoning.
With this arrangement in fig.1, the objectives FAVER are
to:
i. Isolate single and interacting faults that affect local
systems as well as have an interacting macro effect on
other systems in the interaction network.
ii. Find and resolve ambiguity among the faults flagged.
iii. Expand the framework to accommodate other aircraft
systems.
This paper is the final part of a three-year project to build
the FAVER framework. Several parts of the framework have
previously been documented and are shown in fig.2. A brief
recap of previous work is given here in order to explain the
overall scale of the work and the current contribution:
A. THOUGHT EXPERIMENT AND ASSUMPTIONS
A thought experiment was conducted using the fuel rig [19].
It examined the complexity of such a system and helped
define the assumptions necessary for the framework to be
developed in a three-year time period while incorporating
sufficient complexity to enable realistic demonstration of
capability. The assumptions made in this work are:
i. The control system is not considered and is assumed
healthy. Introducing the control system to the
framework would have significantly increased the
complexity of the interactions. There are two systems
– electrical and controls – that span most of the
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FIGURE 2. Previous work related to FAVER and contributions in the current paper.
systems on an aircraft. By considering the EPS in this
work, one of these far-reaching systems is explored.
ii. Sensors are always healthy.
iii. Only steady state is considered. Given what is now
known about the reaction of most systems to time-
dependent input, this would be a relatively easy
upgrade.
iv. Only single faults are considered within the systems,
as the emphasis here is to look at interaction faults.
v. There are no false alarms.
These assumptions are planned to be removed or conserva-
tively updated in future projects.
B. LITERATURE REVIEWS
i) A review of the reasoning literature [2], including many
fields apart from aerospace, enabled the selection of
reasoning approaches to be demonstrated in the project.
A generalised reasoning system was derived from com-
paring various reasoning systems; it is applied in devel-
oping FAVER’s architecture. Given the framework that
has now been formed, there is scope for additional
approaches to be considered; some are given at the end
of this paper.
ii) A review of the roles of a DT in the overall engineering
process, and IVHM in particular 1], showed how a DT
would work in an IVHM system and allowed standards
such as OSA-CBM to be introduced into the develop-
ment process of FAVER.
C. DIGITAL TWINS AND SYSTEM DIAGNOSTICS
i) A DT for the EPS was created via a MATLAB-
SIMULINK model along with its own diagnostics [23].
The diagnostics used ANFIS (Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy
Inference System) combined with causal reasoning and
is capable of isolating ten fault modes.
ii) Subsequently, a generalised methodology, guided by
OSA-CBM, was devised for system diagnostics and
demonstrated on the fuel system, ECS, and engine sys-
tems [20]. The diagnostic for the FS, represented byHIL
as mentioned above, is a decision tree-based function
that can isolate five fault modes. The engine was devel-
oped using T-MATS in MATLAB-SIMULINK [24]; its
diagnostics function is made up of machine learning
algorithm k-Nearest Neighbour (kNN), and it can isolate
eight fault modes. The ECS model is a MATLAB SIM-
SCAPE model called SESAC [25], and its system level
diagnostic function uses a Linear Discriminant Analy-
sis (LDA) algorithm and can isolate six fault modes.
D. CURRENT CONTRIBUTION
The current contribution is also shown in fig.2 and comprises
a demonstration of the strength of FAVER’s architecture
through its significant features and its reasoning through real-
world examples. It contains the following:
i) The architecture of FAVER: its building blocks and
working mechanism, and demonstrations on its vital
properties– scalability and flexibility.
a) The flexibility of FAVER is demonstrated by using
different types of system DTs and system diagnos-
tics in the framework.
b) For scalability, the demonstration is done by
expanding the framework in two steps by includ-
ing new faults to every system’s diagnostics in the
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FIGURE 3. The architecture of FAVER.
framework, and by including twomore complicated
aircraft systems.
The demonstration details through activity diagrams,
the requirements and steps necessary to include a new system
into the framework, and new faults to the systems and show
how easily FAVER can be adapted for such a change.
ii) The reasoning part of FAVER uses a novel knowl-
edge base for its expert system and a mixture of
reasoning techniques. The paper demonstrates the
strength of FAVER’s reasoning in isolating the root
causes and predicting the cascading effects of inter-
acting faults. For this purpose, a variety of exam-
ples are adapted from real aircraft accident cases.
Various combinations of faults, such as simultane-
ous single faults, multiple interaction faults, single
as well as interaction faults, are also examined to
resolve ambiguities arising from such scenarios.
iiii) The overall framework is critically evaluated in two
steps:
a) This paper presents the cost of using FAVER’s
reasoning, such as the need to assign priorities
and misclassification costs.
b) The reasoning part of FAVER is compared with
a data driven reasoning using a neural network,
and the pros and cons of using FAVER’s reason-
ing are explained.
III. FAVER ARCHITECTURE
To implement the schematic of FAVER shown in fig.1, the
architecture of FAVER is developed by bringing together two
distinct layers: i) DT and ii) Reasoning, through a mediating
third layer, viz, iii) Communications layer. FAVER’s architec-
ture as shown in fig.3, has a layered structure comprising of
federated modules. The architecture is developed by adapting
a directed System-of-Systems (SoS) methodology [26]. Here,
FAVER is characterised as a platform of SoS and its build-
ing blocks (modules) like the aircraft system DTs and their
diagnostics, which are usually independent, work together as
SoS for the central purpose of diagnosing faults at the vehicle
level. This is accompanied by the other modules required for
fault isolation at the vehicle level as well as communication
between three layers.
A V-diagram model is adapted for the development of
FAVER’s architecture, as shown in fig.4. This is based
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FIGURE 4. The V-diagram adapted for FAVER.
on the guidelines provided for capturing requirements for
an IVHM system using a System Engineering methodol-
ogy [27]. Through this V-diagram, the objectives of FAVER
mentioned in section II are mapped as the general require-
ments of FAVER as a platform, and its architectural blocks
are characterised to achieve the overall objectives. FAVER’s
architecture is structured in three levels: i) Level 1: FAVER
(as a platform), ii) Level 2: DT layer, Reasoning layer and
Communications layer, and iii) Level 3: DT modules and
Domain modules. Since FAVER is considered as a SoS,
most of its modules, especially the system DTs are sup-
posed to be functioning independently, a Holistic Require-
ments model [28] is approached for collecting i) Operational
Requirements, ii) Functional Requirements, and iii) Non-
functional Requirements for all three layers of FAVER in
level 2. For the lower-level modules and their components,
only functional requirements are collected, as they collec-
tively meet the operational and non-functional requirements
defined for upper level layers. Table 1 shows the list of
requirements captured for FAVER at each level and the ways
through which they are addressed. The features and the func-
tions of the building blocks of FAVER’s architecture are
described in the following subsections.
A. DIGITAL TWIN (DT) LAYER
The DT layer consists of aircraft system DTs as individual
modules. The key characteristic features of the DT layer are
as follows.
i) To ensure the flexibility of the framework, each DT
of an aircraft system can be either physics-based,
function-based models or data-driven representations
for emulating the usual operations including the inter-
actions of the aircraft systems. The DT layer can also
contain an HiL representation of a system.
The DTs would accommodate adjusting of parameters to
produce the output that matches the symptom vectors, for
the cases of ambiguity. The role of these DTs is to run the
simulation based on the input from the DT facilitator and
provide the health state of the system as the output in the form
of a symptom vector required for further reasoning. These
DTs are also used to generate data required for developing
diagnostics for the concerned systems.
ii) Each DT has the property of encapsulation and
performs I/O only with the DT Facilitator. It does
not correspond directly with other DTs, as this
would lead to a high degree of complexity when a
new DT is introduced for the expansion the frame-
work. Instead, the DT Facilitator orchestrates run-
ning each DT and the interactions between them,
maintaining the modular characteristic of system-
of-systems.
Using this approach enables systems on different scales to
work together. For example, in the demonstrations shown in
this paper, the engine DT is for a Pratt and Whitney JT9D
engine, while the fuel system is a benchtop fuel system in
the laboratory. The DT Facilitator handles the interaction
between the two systems on a 0-100% basis rather than in
engineering units. This modularity feature in the DT layer
prevents a complex, time-consuming, Verification, and Val-
idation (V&V) process, which would otherwise be required
for every update in the DT, or all the DTs in the interaction
network when a new system is added to the framework.
B. REASONING LAYER
The Reasoning layer, acting through the Domain Facilitator,
is responsible for retaining knowledge at the vehicle level.
It simultaneously processes the symptomvectors alignedwith
multiple system diagnostics to carry out reasoning at the vehi-
cle level, to isolate faults and their root causes, and predict
cascading effects. The Reasoning layer is adapted from a
generalised reasoning system derived as part of the back-
groundwork for setting up this framework [2]. TheReasoning
layer consists of a domain module acting as the brain of
FAVER. The domain module comprises diagnostic functions
at the systems level and an expert system at the vehicle level.
It also has the vehicle level reasoning algorithm that consists
of a forward chaining mechanism of rule based reasoning,
wherein the goals of identifying whether the faults are single
or interacting, and clearing the ambiguity, are achieved with
a set of ‘if-then-else’ rules. The rules are defined to provide
‘approximate’ results, which are then treated as evidence for
an incomplete hypothesis by the experts to provide the final
results, i.e. abductive reasoning.
1) FAVER’S EXPERT SYSTEM
The significance of FAVER’s expert system at the vehicle
level is its knowledge base, which is made up of a novel
combination of a relationship matrix and a fault attributes
database. The relationship matrix is created at the vehicle
level by experts to establish the interacting relationships
between the aircraft systems. To complement this, the fault
attributes database is a tuple consisting of five elements as
given by:
Fault Attributes Database = {L, C, O, MC, ME} (1)
where, L = System fault label
C = Fault codes
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TABLE 1. Requirements of FAVER.
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O = Fault’s system of origin
MC =Macro_Cause
ME =Macro_Effect
While data for the first three attributes can be col-
lected from the respective system diagnostics, the attributes
Macro_Cause and Macro_Effect are defined below.
a: MACRO_CAUSE
This attribute is defined as the possibility of a fault being
caused by another system and, with pc being the possibility
of a fault caused by another system, is defined by:
Macro_Cause =
{
1, if pc > 0
0, if pc = 0
(2)
b: MACRO_EFFECT
This attribute is defined as the possibility of a fault affect-
ing another system. With pe being the possibility of a fault
affecting another system, it is given by:
Macro_Effect =
{
1, if pe > 0
0, if pe = 0
(3)
The combination of a vehicle level relationship matrix with
a fault attributes database enables a scalable expansion of
knowledge, containing cause and effect relationships between
the aircraft systems in a simpler and more efficient way than
with a traditional relationship matrix.
The following illustration shows the difference between the
knowledge base of FAVER’s expert system and a traditional
relationship matrix. Since the first three attributes of the fault
attributes database are updated from the system diagnostics
without any changes, they are not shown in its structure in
the illustrations.
A traditional relationship matrix between systems and
their faults will involve experts developing the relationship
between each fault in both systems. Searching such a relation-
ship matrix will give the results of whether a particular fault
could be caused by any other fault from the other system. The
size of such a matrix M, with n systems, is:




(No. of faults in System i)
)2
(4)
The matrix M gets disproportionately large as more sys-
tems are brought into the framework. For example, consider
two systems A and B with two fault modes each, A1, A2, B1,
and B2. As per (4), a traditional relationship matrix would
be of size 4 × 4, with 16 cells, as seen in fig.5. Consider
the scenario where two new systems C and D are added in
FAVER with four fault modes each: C1, C2, C3, C4 and
D1, D2, D3, and D4. Now, the relationship matrix has to
be increased in size to develop the relationship between the
12 faults. Hence the resulting matrix will have 144 elements
for four systems with a total of 12 faults. From fig.5, the
number of cells to be updated becomes 128. The experts
FIGURE 5. Traditional relationship matrix versus the combination of
vehicle level relationship matrix with fault attributes database.
should develop the relationship for the n+ jth system against
all the elements belonging to n systems, as given by:








(No. of faults in System i)2 (5)
where, n = no. of existing systems in the framework
j = no. of new systems added to the framework
However, in the case of FAVER’s expert system, when a
new system, n + j, is brought into the framework, the size
of the existing relationship matrix n2 goes to (n + j)2. The
number of new elements to be updated in the vehicle level
relationship matrix is given by j(2n + j). Experts will have
to update the fault attributes database only for two attributes
per fault (‘Macro_Cause’; ‘Macro_Effect’). Hence the total
number of elements to be updated in FAVER’s expert system
is given by:
No. of new elements to be updated in FAVER’s expert
system = j (2n+ j)+ (
∑j
i=1
(No. of faults in ith system)
∗2) (6)
As seen from fig.5, when the combination of relationship
matrix at vehicle level and a fault attributes database is used,
in place of a traditional relationship matrix, the number of
cells to be updated according to (6) are 12 + 16 = 28. This
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difference will be larger in practical scenarios when more air-
craft systems with multiple faults are added to the framework.
Thus, this arrangement of knowledge base in FAVER’s expert
system saves considerable time for the experts to update the
knowledge base when new systems are added to the frame-
work.
c: ADVANTAGES
This novel arrangement of knowledge is similar to the tra-
ditional relationship matrix, in the sense that it is developed
by experts. However, when a new system is brought into
the framework, the relationship matrix at the top level will
only increase by one row and one column with 2n + 1 new
elements, and the fault attributes database will increase only
in rows depending upon the number of faults in the new
system. In the case of a new fault from an existing system,
the relationship matrix at the top level will not change in its
dimensions, and the fault attributes database will have one
more row added to it. This provides controlled scalability to
an expanding platform like FAVER.
One more advantage of using a fault attributes database is
that the knowledge that needs to be populated for a new fault
is only for two attributes: {‘Macro_Cause’; ‘Macro_Effect’}.
Hence, updating the knowledge database becomes simpler
with the fault attributes database. In the case of a traditional
relationship matrix, for every new fault, be it cause or effect,
the relationship must be populated against all the existing
faults. Even when the traditional relationship matrix could
use advanced formats like sparse matrix and update only the
non-zero elements of the matrix, it will still take a lot of
memory and time to maintain such a database and validate
every relationship. In the case of a fault attributes database,
adding new faults for the existing systems or adding new
faults from new systems will require only two attributes for
each one of them. The use of a fault attributes database
rearranges the same available information regarding a fault’s
cause and effect, resulting in a more scalable and efficient
knowledge database for FAVER.
C. COMMUNICATIONS LAYER
This contains the Central facilitator, which forms the bridge
between the DT layer and the Reasoning layer. The Central
facilitator fetches the input symptom vector from the user
and passes it on to the system level diagnostics in the rea-
soning layer through the Domain facilitator. The working
mechanism of the Central facilitator is based on a case based
reasoning methodology. In this, the results of rule based
approximate reasoning from the reasoning layer are retrieved,
interpreted, and revised through abductive reasoning, and the
new knowledge is returned back to the Reasoning layer. The
results on the type of faults, their root causes, and cascading
effects are then output back to the user through the Central
Facilitator.
The architecture of OSA-CBM, used as a guideline, con-
sists of Information specification (data model) and Inter-
face specification. The data model of OSA-CBM consists
of four classes: DataEvent, Configuration, Explanation, and
Extension. The Interface specification of OSA-CBM has four
types: Asynchronous, Synchronous, Service, and Specifica-
tion [29]. In line with these specifications, the DT layer and
the Reasoning layer of FAVER’s architecture are mapped to
the OSA-CBM data model as a Configuration data class,
comprising algorithms, simulation models, domain knowl-
edge and all the required input sources. The communication
layer of FAVER interfaces with the user and constitutes the
data belonging to DataEvent class of OSA-CBM data model,
comprising of input parameters and output results. As FAVER
is in the initial stages of implementation, Explanation and
Extension classes are not used in FAVER. A synchronous
interface is adapted from the Interface specification of OSA-
CBM to return the required data to the calling functions.
The functions are developed in MATLAB and data are stored
as MS Excel files. As and when FAVER is adapted for
real-world industrial applications all data will be converted
to XML formats to align fully with OSA-CBM standards.
D. ILLUSTRATION OF FAVER ARCHITECTURE
An illustration of FAVER’s architecture showcasing the char-
acteristics of each layer described in this section, along with
the various information flowing between them, and the steps
to expand the framework are shown in fig.6. In Stage 1 basic
functionality is established, while Stage 2 shows how the
framework is expanded to accommodate new systems. The
faults for all four aircraft systems are selected based on
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) carried out for
each aircraft system, and categorized in one of two classes:
i. A faults that leads only to local (or micro) effects,
ii. A fault that leads to global (or macro) effects.
Table 2 shows the FMEA carried for the faults chosen for
FAVER demonstration. A thorough FMEA for all faults in the
four aircraft systems is not feasible, due to the lack of openly
available knowledge of aircraft failure modes. Instead, only a
subset of faults is chosen for FMEA in such a way that each
system has a certain number of faults with micro and macro
effects affecting the systems in their interaction network. The
faults with only local and system level effects are considered
single faults with micro effects and the faults with global
effects are considered as interacting faults with cascading
effects. This is done to help demonstrate the capabilities of
isolation of both single and interacting faults by FAVER’s
reasoning and using the vehicle level knowledge to isolate
their root causes and predict their cascading effects in their
interaction network.
1) STAGE 1
The three layers of FAVER are set up and are tested against
their requirements from table 1 using two systems: i) the EPS,
and the ii) Fuel system, as seen in the middle portion of fig.6.
The chosen representation of the EPS DT is a B737 model
developed in Matlab Simulink, with an ANFIS diagnos-
tics capable of isolating three fault modes: i) AC Instru
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FIGURE 6. An illustration of activities in FAVER architecture.
lamp switch open, ii) FS Valve switch open, and iii) FS
Pump motor low voltage. The EPS interacts with all the
systems under consideration by powering their pumps and
valves. It also receives shaft power from the engine and this
reaction will be considered in Stage 2 when the engine is
included in the framework. From table 2, it can be seen
that the fault mode, AC Instru lamp switch open does not
have any Global effect on other systems and hence, it is
considered single {Macro_Cause = 0; Macro_effect = 0}.
On the other hand, FS Valve Switch Open has the global
effect of interfering with the valve opening in the fuel sys-
tem {Macro_Cause = 0; Macro_effect = 1} and FS Pump
motor low voltage reduces the input voltage to fuel pump
{Macro_Cause = 0; Macro_effect = 1}. Further details on
these fault modes and diagnostics can be found in the back-
ground work [23].
The fuel system is represented by an experimental rig
included in the framework as Hardware-in-the-loop, with a
Decision tree diagnostics chosen to isolate three fault modes:
i) Clogged filter, ii) Sticking Valve, and iii) Reduced flow,
which are detailed in the background work [20]. The fuel
system supplies fuel to the engine, and its pump and valves
are powered by the EPS. The fault modes Sticking Valve
and Reduced flow are chosen as they could be of mechanical
origin or could have been caused by FS Valve Switch Open
and FS Pump motor low voltage in the EPS respectively
{Macro_Cause = 1; Macro_effect = 0}, thus resulting in
ambiguity. While the fault mode Reduced flow would auto-
matically affect the engine, since the engine is not considered
in Stage 1, its Macro_effect attribute is considered ‘0’ at this
stage. It will later be updated when the engine is included in
the framework. The fault mode Clogged filter is simulated to
obstruct the fuel flow; the effect of this degradation over the
EPS is considered to be negligible and can be updated later
{Macro_Cause = 0; Macro_effect = 0}.
The abovementioned interactions between the EPS and the
fuel system, and their attribute values for each fault modes
are populated in the form of relationship matrix and the fault
attributes database, forming the vehicle level knowledge in
the reasoning layer, as seen in the middle portion of fig.6. The
EPS and the fuel system chosen are of different scales, they
do not interact with each other directly but only through the
DT facilitator (where the interaction is converted to 0-100%
scale) and use different types of system level diagnostics
to ensuring the modularity, showcasing the flexibility of
FAVER’s architecture.
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The middle portion of fig.6 also shows the vehicle level
reasoning algorithm that is used to isolate the cascading faults
and their root causes. Once the modules in the reasoning
layer and the DT layer are set up, the requirement of FAVER
can be tested, to isolate single faults in the EPS and the
fuel system, and interacting faults between these systems,
resulting in ambiguity. For this, the user has to generate and
input the symptom vector under investigation, into the dialog
box generated by the Central facilitator (as seen in the left
portion of fig.6). The Central facilitator then follows case
based reasoning methodology, passes on the symptom vector
to the reasoning layer and after a series of steps, shown in the
left and middle portions of fig.6, provides the output to the
user for the final step of abductive reasoning.
Thus, in Stage 1, the architecture of FAVER is set up and
demonstrated for its flexibility and its ability to isolate single
and interacting faults in presence of ambiguity.
2) STAGE 2
In stage 2 of development of FAVER’s architecture,
the framework is tested for its ability to expand with ease,
to retain new knowledge for existing systems and to include
new aircraft systems for investigation, as shown in the right
portion of fig.6. This is to satisfy the requirement of scalabil-
ity of FAVER. The term scalability has different definitions
based on the industries where it is applied. From a system’s
point of view, scalability is defined as an attribute that defines
a system’s capability to adapt to increasing demand or work-
load. This property is significant in FAVER for two reasons:
i) Health reasoning at the vehicle level requires consid-
eration of the behaviours of multiple aircraft systems.
It is not possible to include all aircraft systems in this
work, due to time constraints and logistics constraints,
hence testing of FAVER for scalability is necessary.
While FAVER uses two aircraft systems (the FS and
the EPS) in Stage 1, scaling up the framework in Stage
2 to four systems (adding engine and ECS), is neces-
sary to achieve health assessment with a holistic view
of the aircraft and demonstrate scalability.
ii) Aircraft systems are ever-evolving, adapting to
achieve different objectives such as more electric
or all-electric aircraft and sustainable aviation. This
leads to constant updates to the system level diagnos-
tics, either to include new complicated faults that are
to be diagnosed, or to remove the obsolete ones. Since
the vehicle level reasoning in FAVER is built upon the
system level diagnostics (as seen in Stage 1) it has to
adapt to process new sets of faults and new knowledge
from these aircraft systems, without much changes to
its structure, in order to isolate their root causes and
predict cascading effects.
FAVER can be expanded in the following ways:
a: ADDING NEW FAULTS TO EXISTING SYSTEMS
Given that the respective system DTs and their diagnostics
are updated to provide and isolate the symptom vectors,
the corresponding new faults can be added to the framework
just by updating the fault attributes database. Two new fault
modes are added to both the EPS and the fuel system. These
are highlighted in middle portion of fig.6, under each sys-
tem’s fault modes. For the EPS, the new fault modes added are
i) Eng BleedValve switch stuck open and ii) ECS TCValve
switch stuck open. From table 2, it can be seen that the
former fault mode can affect the power supplied to the bleed
valve in the engine, whereas the latter can affect the power
supplied to the temperature control valve in the ECS. Hence,
the attribute values for both these faults are {Macro_Cause=
0; Macro_effect= 1}. The new fault modes added to the fuel
system are i) Blocked Flow Meter and ii) Clogged Nozzle.
Both these faults could either be ofmechanical origin or could
have been caused by any fault in the power supplied by the
EPS. Hence, their attribute values are {Macro_Cause = 1;
Macro_effect = 0}. Once these attribute values are updated
for all four faults along with their fault codes in the fault
attributes database, FAVER’s reasoning will be capable of
isolating these faults, isolating their root causes and warning
of their cascading effects at the vehicle level.
b: ADDING NEW SYSTEMS TO THE FRAMEWORK
As seen in the right portion of fig.6, for the new systems, the
engine and the ECS to be added to the framework, both these
systems require their standalone DTs and system diagnostics.
Similar to stage 1, the DTs and fault modes with diagnostics
are chosen from the previous work [20].
The engine is represented by a Pratt and Whitney JT9D
model developed in Matlab Simulink with five fault modes
chosen: i) Bleed Valve Stuck, ii) CDP Leakage, iii) HPC
Contamination, iv) Reduced Fuel, and v) LPT Blade Bro-
ken; a Linear Discriminant Analysis algorithm is developed
to isolate these faults. As the engine interacts with all four sys-
tems under consideration in FAVER, it raises several ambigu-
ous scenarios. Fault mode Bleed Valve Stuck could be of
mechanical origin located in the engine itself or it could have
been caused to the fault mode Eng BleedValve switch stuck
open from the EPS, giving raise to ambiguity. This fault could
affect the ECS by obstructing the bleed supply. Hence, its
attribute values are {Macro_Cause = 1; Macro_effect = 1}.
Customer Discharge Pressure (CDP) leakage is simu-
lated as a mechanical leak affecting the bleed supply to
the ECS, and its attribute values are {Macro_Cause = 0;
Macro_effect = 1}. Fault mode Reduced Fuel is simulated
to reduce the output of engine and thus it affects all the sys-
tems it interacts with. This fault mode is caused by Reduced
flow from the fuel system. Hence, its attribute values are
{Macro_Cause = 1; Macro_effect = 1}. Fault modes High
Pressure Compressor (HPC) Contamination and Low Pres-
sure Turbine (LPT) Blade Broken are simulated to reduce
the efficiency of the engine but not affect its output, and
they are of mechanical origin, thus having attribute values
{Macro_Cause = 0; Macro_effect = 0}.
The ECS is represented by a B737-800 model devel-
oped in a simulation package called SESAC [22]. Five fault
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TABLE 2. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) for faults in four aircraft systems.
modes are chosen for its integration to FAVER: i) Low Bleed
Air Pressure, ii) CDP Leak, iii) ACM Low Efficiency, iv)
PHX Fouling, and v) TCValve stuck. The ECS interacts
mainly with the engine for the bleed air supply and its
Temperature Control Valves (TCV) are powered by the EPS.
Its output affects the cabin pressure directly. Fault modes
Low Bleed Air Pressure and Customer Discharge Pressure
(CDP) Leak are simulated to have been caused by the
engine faults Bleed Valve Stuck and CDP Leakage respec-
tively and hence their attribute values are {Macro_Cause = 0;
Macro_effect = 1}. As seen in table 2, fault modes Air
Cycle Machine (ACM) Low Efficiency and Primary Heat
Exchanger (PHX) Fouling are of local origin and their
attribute values are {Macro_Cause = 0; Macro_effect = 0}.
Fault mode Temperature Control Valve (TCValve) stuck
could either be a local mechanical fault or it could have been
caused by the fault mode TCValve switch stuck open from
the EPS and hence its attribute values are {Macro_Cause = 1;
Macro_effect = 0}.
In order to add these aircraft systems and their faults to
the framework, the abovementioned faults and their attributes
for both the engine and the ECS must be added to the fault
attributes table. The Reasoning layer has to be given access
to the system diagnostics and, as seen in the left portion
of fig.6, the Central Facilitator should be updated to fetch
the symptom vector from these systems to make the final
vehicle symptom vector as the input. These are the only
changes to FAVER’s architecture to expand and include more
systems into the framework. The run-time of the vehicle level
reasoning algorithm to isolate faults at the vehicle level is not
majorly affected by the number of systems included in the
framework, due to modularity, thus proving that FAVER is
easily scalable without much penalty on its performance.
c: UPDATING NEW KNOWLEDGE TO THE FRAMEWORK
One of the main requirements of FAVER is the ability to
update and retain new knowledge on existing database. Con-
sider the fault mode Reduced flow in the fuel system, added
to the framework in Stage 1. At that point, the engine is
not included in FAVER and hence its effect on the engine
is not considered. After the engine is added in stage 2,
the Reduced flow fault mode should be updated to reflect
its cascading effect on the engine, resulting in Reduced fuel
mode in the engine. Hence the only change needs to be done
is to change its attribute values from {Macro_Cause = 1;
Macro_effect = 0} to {Macro_Cause = 1; Macro_effect =
1}. Another example of updating knowledge is the Clogged
filter mode in the fuel system. The effect of this fault mode
on the EPS is considered to be negligible initially. However,
if the experts find more evidence that Clogged filter seems
to affect the EPS considerably, the relationship matrix should
be updated to reflect that the fuel system affects the EPS and
the attributes in fault attributes database should be updated as
{Macro_Cause = 0; Macro_effect = 1}. Only these changes
by the experts are sufficient for FAVER’s reasoning algorithm
to isolate the root causes and identify the cascading effects of
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TABLE 2. (Continued.) Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) for faults in four aircraft systems.
these faults on the systems at the vehicle level. This helps in
keeping the knowledge base of the expert system updated in
FAVER in times of evolving scenarios, with relative ease.
IV. FAVER’s REASONING: USE CASE DEMONSTRATIONS
While section III detailed about FAVER’s architecture and its
key features of flexibility, expandability and scalability, this
section demonstrates the strength of FAVER’s reasoning.
The interactions between the EPS, the fuel system, the
engine, and the ECS in the aircraft are substantial from the
operations, maintenance, and safety perspective [30]. Acci-
dent events, like the engine rollback on a B777 as a result
of fuel starvation [14], [15], the engine inflight shutdown in
an experimental aircraft due to a burnt electric fuel boost
pump [31], and an emergency descent due to cabin pressuri-
sation resulting from engine bleed air system failure [32],
show that despite the rarity, such worst-case scenarios do
occur. Moreover, with the current trend moving towards the
more-electric engine and more-electric aircraft, the influence
of the EPS over the FS, the engine, and the ECS is growing
significantly [23], [30]. Hence, use cases similar to these
accident scenarios are used for demonstration. While each
of the aircraft system diagnostics developed as background
work for FAVER can isolate several fault modes, only a few of
them are used for demonstration in this paper. The expanded
version of FAVER with four aircraft systems and system
diagnostics isolating five faults each, as shown in fig.6 is used
for demonstrations in this section.
A. ACCIDENT SCENARIO 1
In line with the incidents of engine rollback caused by a
blockage in the fuel system [14] and [15], and an engine
inflight shutdown due to a burnt fuel boost pump resulting
in fuel starvation [31], consider a scenario where a low volt-
age supply fault arises in the EPS and affects the FS pump
motor, which in turn could reduce fuel supply to the engine.
Fig.7 shows the development of the use case scenario as four
stages as listed below. Every stage of fault propagation is
one simulation run with the vehicle symptom vector given
by the user, which are generated separately through the DTs
simulations.
Stage 1: All systems are healthy.
Stage 2: Single fault (FS Pump Motor Low Voltage) aris-
ing in the EPS and rest of the systems are healthy.
Stage 3: FS Pump Motor Low Voltage from the EPS
affecting the fuel system (FS) triggering Reduced flow fault,
and its effect has not transpired to the interacting systems yet.
Stage 4: Reduced flow fault in the fuel system cascading
to the engine (ENG) triggering Reduced fuel from the fuel
system fault, and the ECS remains healthy.
The reasoning results of abovementioned stages are aggre-
gated as one figure (fig.7(a)) to show how FAVER’s rea-
soning will isolate faults, their root causes and predict their
cascading effects during each stage of the fault propagation.
The left side of each simulation run in fig.7(a) shows the
current state of systems through diagrams. In these diagrams,
the healthy interactions in simulation runs are indicated by
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FIGURE 7. Use case scenario of fault originating in the EPS propagating to the FS and the engine.
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green lines, interactions having the potential to cascade faults
are indicated by blue lines, and the interactions that have
cascaded the effects are shown as red lines, for clarity. The
use case scenario starts with the stage 1, where four systems
are healthy. In the next stages, the simulations are run with
fault injected in the systems. The right side of each simulation
run in fig.7(a) shows the corresponding results from FAVER’s
reasoning displayed by the Central Facilitator. Fig.7(b) shows
the overall development of fault propagation scenario versus
time, indicating the current health states of all four aircraft
systems and FAVER’s prediction of cascading faults and
identification of root causes at each stage of fault propagation.
Simulation run 1 of fig.7 (a), (b) shows the first stage where
all the systems are healthy and diagnosed as such.
In simulation run 2, the vehicle symptom vector consists
of FS Pump Motor Low Voltage fault in the EPS, and other
systems at healthy states. The vehicle symptom vector is input
to the Central facilitator and the fault FS Pump Motor Low
Voltage detected through the Domain Facilitator’s System
diagnostic algorithms (fig.3). The fault is detected as being
in the EPS, and all other systems are judged healthy by the
Central facilitator. This is shown by the first six lines of
the Central facilitator result for Simulation run 2 in fig.7(a).
Physically, this low voltage input to the fuel system AC
motor pump could result in reduced rotor speed and torque
of the pump (simulation details can be found in previous
work [23]). This fault would essentially affect the fuel pump
as indicated by the blue colored line in fig.7(a). FAVER
detects this potential propagation by passing the detected
fault into the Domain Knowledge part of the Reasoning layer.
Here FAVER’s rule based approximate reasoning uses the
relationship matrix to identify the related systems to the EPS
and the fault attributes database to identify if the fault FS
PumpMotor LowVoltage hasMacro_cause orMacro_effect.
It then predicts the possible cascading effect to the fuel system
through the Central facilitator, last three lines in fig.7(a). The
same is highlighted in fig.7(b), where for stage 2, the EPS is
highlighted in red colour for being affected by a fault and the
fuel system (FS) is highlighted in amber colour as FAVER
predicts against this system for potential cascading effect,
Having stepped through this case in detail, the other cases
are described more briefly.
Simulation run 3 shows the next potential stage of fault
propagation, where the fault FS Pump Motor Low Voltage
affects the fuel system. Here, the vehicle symptom vector
input consists of FS Pump Motor Low Voltage fault in the
EPS, and Reduced flow in the fuel system, and the other
two systems are healthy. The symptom vector is input into
the Central facilitator and results in both the EPS and the
FS being flagged as faulty (RHS of simulation run 3 in
fig.7(a)). Further, the possibility of Reduced flow from the
fuel system affecting the engine is identified by the rule based
approximate reasoning with the expert systems knowledge
in Domain Knowledge. This also leads to the tracking of
the potential root cause to the EPS, as well as predicting its
effect over the engine, which is reported back to the Central
facilitator. This is highlighted in fig.7(b), where, for stage 3,
the EPS and the FS are highlighted in red colour for being
affected by faults, the ENG is highlighted in amber colour
for the potential of being affected as a cascading effect, and
the possible root cause for the fault is FS is mapped to the
EPS.
In the final stage of fault propagation of this use case sce-
nario, the Reduced flow fault from the fuel system provides
a lower fuel flow to the engine; this behaviour is translated to
the engine DT by the Reduced fuel fault mode.
The resulting symptom vector is input to the Central facil-
itator, and simulation run 4 shows the result. The Diagnostic
algorithms return a fault in 3 systems to the Central facilitator,
with only the ECS being healthy.
FAVER’s reasoning, in the Domain knowledge, tracks the
cause of the engine’s fault to the FS, and then maintains the
root cause with the EPS, as seen in the RHS of Simulation
run 4 in fig.7(a). The same is highlighted in fig.7(b). It should
also be noted that, as seen in fig.7(a), the engine’s cascading
effect prediction is given for the EPS and the ECS, taking
into consideration the shaft power provided by the engine
to the EPS and the bleed air supply to the ECS respectively
(highlighted by a blue line in the LHS of simulation run 4 in
fig.7(a)).
B. ACCIDENT SCENARIO 2
In 2008, an Airbus A319 aircraft made an emergency descent
of 11000 ft, which resulted from the wrong engine bleed
air system being chosen for fault isolation by the pilot. The
faulty engine bleed air system chosen failed during flight and,
because the pilots inadvertently switched off the other bleed
air system, an emergency descent had to be made because of
cabin depressurisation, and oxygen masks were deployed for
the passengers [32].
Two use cases are developed similar to this accident sce-
nario. ABleed Valve Stuck fault is triggered in the engine DT,
through both mechanical (local) origin and electrical origin
by Eng BleedValve switch stuck open fault mode from the
EPS; the corresponding behaviour in the ECS DT is observed
by triggering the Low Bleed Air Pressure fault through sim-
ulations. The results from the system level diagnostics are
used for vehicle level reasoning in FAVER, by providing
their symptom vectors to the Central facilitator, to check
if FAVER’s reasoning can identify the root cause of these
faults. Fig.8 shows the results of the bleed valve fault through
two different origins. In case 1, the Bleed Valve Stuck fault
is found in the engine and is propagated to the ECS by
translating its effect of reduced bleed air output to the ECS
DT, leading to Low Bleed Air Pressure fault. In this case,
the Central facilitator in fig.8(a) identifies the root cause of
the Low Bleed Air Pressure fault in the ECS to be originated
from the engine. This is expanded in fig.8(c), where the
affected engine is highlighted in red for stage 1 and the ECS
is highlighted to be affected in stage 2. (Only the result of
simulation run 2 is shown in fig.8(a) for brevity). In case 2
(fig.8(b)), the Eng BleedValve switch stuck open fault mode
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FIGURE 8. Use case scenario of bleed valve stuck fault cascading to the ECS with mechanical and electrical origin.
is found in the EPS and is warned by FAVER to affect the
engine. The Central facilitator in fig.8(b) shows the potential
root cause of the Bleed Valve Stuck fault in the engine is
from the EPS, and it also shows the possible cascading effect
to be found in the ECS. As the ECS has interactions with
two systems which has interaction faults, the approximate
reasoning of FAVER identifies the potential root cause of
Low Bleed Air Pressure fault to be found in either of the two
systems (engine or the EPS). The different stages involved in
the fault progression for electrical origin of this fault scenario
is seen in fig.8(d) and the results of FAVER at each stage are
highlighted along with the potential and additional root cause
warnings from FAVER.
Thus, this section demonstrates the ability of FAVER’s
reasoning to isolate single and interacting faults, as well as
resolve ambiguities by highlighting the original root cause of
such interacting faults. It can be seen from both the accident
scenarios that FAVER is able to predict the potential cas-
cading effects at every stage of fault propagation along with
identifying their root causes at the vehicle level. These results
could be used by the engineers to troubleshoot and resolve
such scenarios during maintenance, well in advance and in a
shorter time period.
V. PROS AND CONS OF FAVER’S REASONING
This section presents some of the pros and cons of FAVER’s
reasoning.
A. CASES OF MULTIPLE FAULTS
It is quite common for faults from multiple systems to be
flagged simultaneously by systems diagnostics in a complex
vehicle like an aircraft. These faults could be independent of
each other or may occur due to their interactions with other
systems, and they give rise to ambiguity. One of the objectives
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of reasoning is to resolve this ambiguity by clearing these
ambiguous scenarios by identifying whether they are simul-
taneous single faults or which fault is the root cause in case of
interaction faults. Fig.9 shows four different scenarios where
FAVER can differentiate interacting faults from simultaneous
single faults, clearing ambiguity.
Case 1 in fig.9 shows the scenario of an interaction fault
with three of the four systems involved while the fuel system
has a single fault simultaneously. The interaction fault in
Case 1 is the electrical origin case of accident scenario 2,
where the Bleed Valve Stuck fault in the engine, caused by
Eng Bleed Valve switch stuck open fault mode from the EPS
resulting in Low Bleed Air Pressure in the ECS. Meanwhile,
fault mode Clogged Filter is chosen for the FS and it is
assumed not to affect any other system. The vehicle symptom
vector containing all these health states are given to the
Central facilitator, and all four system diagnostics are flagged
for faults, as a result, giving rise to an ambiguous scenario.
The result of FAVER’s reasoning, in this case, can be seen
in case 1 of fig.9. The rule based approximate reasoning is
able to distinguish the Clogged Filter fault in the FS as a
single fault from the interactive fault involving the other three
systems, identifying the root cause to have originated from
the EPS and warning of the cascading effects to the ECS from
the engine.
Another scenario is tested, as shown in case 2 in fig.9,
where two simultaneous, interacting faults are injected in the
system DTs. The fault mode, FS Valve switch stuck open in
the EPS is assumed to cause Sticking Valve fault mode in the
fuel system. Simultaneously, a leak in the CDP of the bleed
air duct in the engine (CDP Leakage) provides less bleed air
to the ECS. This behaviour is translated to the ECS DT and
is detected by the ECS diagnostics as CDP Leak. Case 2 in
fig.9 shows that FAVER’s reasoning can differentiate both of
interacting faults and suggest their possible root causes and
cascading effects.
In case 3 of fig.9, all four systems have faults that are
assumed to have only local effects and do not affect any other
systems. InstruLamp fault mode affects the lighting in the
cockpit instrument panel [21]. Clogged Filter fault mode in
the FS results in increased pump speed to meet the fuel flow
demand but does not affect any other connected system.HPC
Contamination is the fault mode as a result of contamination
in the high pressure compressor in the engine, reducing its
efficiency. The ACM low efficiency is the reduced mechan-
ical efficiency of the air cycle machine in the ECS [22].
Case 3 in fig.9 shows that FAVER’s reasoning is capable of
identifying all four single faults that occurred simultaneously,
not confusing with interaction faults.
In case 4 of fig.9, one interaction fault starting from the
EPS affects all the other systems. This use case is a projec-
tion of the accident scenario 1, demonstrated in the previous
subsection and seen in fig.9.While in the previous subsection,
the ECS is shown as healthy, with the potential of Reduced
fuel from FS fault in the engine affecting the ECS, in this
scenario, it is assumed that the fault from the engine results
in Low Bleed Air Pressure fault in the ECS. In this case,
FAVER’s reasoning is able to identify the root causes of fault
for every system and its cascading effect. Similar to case
1 in fig.9, the fault in the ECS in case 4 is suspected to be
originated from either the EPS or the engine. The reason
behind this is discussed in the following subsection.
B. COST OF USING THE NOVEL COMBINATION OF
KNOWLEDGE
In cases 1 and 4 of fig.9, while the Low bleed air pressure
fault is cascading from the engine to the ECS, FAVER’s
reasoning suggests it could either be from the EPS or the
engine. The root cause of fault in the ECS is from the engine,
and that of the engine is from the ECS. But, the root cause
of the fault in the ECS is predicted to have been from the
engine or the EPS. This is the cost of using the combination
of fault attributes database with the vehicle level relationship
matrix in place of the traditional relationship matrix in the
expert system. The accurate root causes in these cases are not
predicted, in favour of less complex and less time-consuming
knowledge format, and are compensated by abductive reason-
ing, where the experts infer the actual root cause from the
choices provided in the Central facilitator. This could also be
corrected by adding text mining or contextual reasoning to
FAVER’s reasoning. However, this method does have short-
comings, since text mining could confuse the reasoning when
texts of multiple systems are present in the fault description.
C. COST OF MISCLASSIFICATION IN SYSTEM LEVEL
DIAGNOSIS
As FAVER’s vehicle level reasoning is built upon the system
level diagnostic functions, the misclassification rates at the
system level are inherited to the reasoning at the vehicle
level. Hence, the misclassification rates are additive for single
faults and multiplicative for interaction faults for FAVER’s
reasoning at the vehicle level.
D. METRICS FOR EVALUATING FAVER
Since FAVER is a layered reasoner, it is not possible to eval-
uate the performance of FAVER by commonly used metrics
like fault detection rate and fault isolation rate. Hence, evalua-
tion metrics developed for reasoners, such as diagnostic cov-
erage, prognostic coverage, accuracy of inferences, latency
in making inferences, and sensitivity to different faults and
degradation conditions should be considered [33].
1) DIAGNOSTIC COVERAGE
A reasoner’s effectiveness is measured by either testing its
ability to isolate test cases that cannot be otherwise isolated
by existing approaches or it can be measured by improve-
ment in latency, accuracy and sensitivity of the faults can be
isolated by existing approaches [33]. FAVER’s effectiveness
is measured by its ability to identify the root causes of the
interacting faults. For this purpose, a comparative study with
data-driven reasoning is performed using supervised neural
networks.
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FIGURE 9. Different multiple fault scenarios (some resulting in ambiguity) reasoned by FAVER.
a: USE CASES DEMONSTRATION WITH NEURAL NETWORKS
To evaluate FAVER’s reasoning, a few use case scenarios
were trained using aNeural Network. TheDT layer in FAVER
is used for the neural network for this comparison study.
A synthetic dataset is prepared for supervised learning by
simulating three DTs (EPS, FS, and engine) for the nine
scenarios listed in table 3.
The neural network is trained using the Levenberg-
Marquardt algorithm [34] in MATLAB. The input symptom
vectors are made up of 61 input parameters directly combined
from the three DTs (6 parameters from FS fuel rig simula-
tion, 39 parameters from the engine T-MATS simulation, and
16 parameters from EPS MATLAB simulation). The neural
network is trained to flag faults at the system level, along
with flags for single and interaction faults and the presence
of ambiguity at the vehicle level, resulting in a total of seven
output classes, as shown in fig.10. The cases are formulated
as a classification problem, with the binary output results
showing if a symptom vector belonged to an output class
or not. The trained neural network provided the results with
100% accuracy on the test dataset. Further customisation of
the neural network is deemed unnecessary at this point.
EVALUATION CRITERIA 1: ACCURACY OF DIAGNOSTICS AT
SYSTEM LEVEL
The data-driven reasoning to identify if a symptom vector
belongs to an output class using neural networks has an
advantage over FAVER’s reasoning, which is, its indepen-
dence of system diagnostic functions. The trained neural
network was able to detect the faults at system level with
100% accuracy without system level diagnostic functions.
The output classes in this demonstration are only trained to
identify if a system is healthy or faulty, but the in-depth super-
vised learning would have made the neural network isolate
the fault modes of the systems as well, without developing
diagnostics for each system.
On the other hand, FAVER uses system level diagnos-
tic functions to make vehicle level assessments. The accu-
racy of system level diagnostics used in the case studies is
above 99% for all four systems [20], [23]. Inheriting these
accuracy levels, FAVER’s reasoning can isolate faults at the
systems level with an accuracy of above 99%. The vehicle
symptom vectors from the system diagnostics required only
20 parameters to carry out system level reasoning in FAVER,
whereas, the trained neural network in fig.10 required data
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FIGURE 10. Neural network fitting to isolate faults at the vehicle level.
TABLE 3. Use case scenarios for neural network training.
from 61 parameters, which is three times when compared to
FAVER’s requirements.
EVALUATION CRITERIA 2: ACCURACY OF DIAGNOSTICS AT
VEHICLE LEVEL
At the vehicle level, the results produced by the data-driven
reasoning cannot be compared directly with FAVER’s rea-
soning. This is because the neural networks can highlight
the presence of single or interacting faults and ambigui-
ties. In contrast, with the help of expert system knowledge,
FAVER’s reasoning can solve ambiguity and isolate the root
cause of an interacting fault.
EVALUATION CRITERIA 3: ACCURACY OF INFERENCES
FAVER can isolate all single faults, interacting faults and
clear ambiguities effectively. However, in certain scenarios
where there are two or more systems interacting directly
with the system containing faults, the results include all the
systems in the interaction network, rather than narrowing
down to a single system. This, however, is compensated by
abductive reasoning.
One main advantage of FAVER against the neural net-
work is the clarity in the outputs produced. While the neu-
ral network depends upon engineering knowledge and DTs
only for curating its datasets and produces results based on
the learning the patterns from its data, FAVER’s reasoning
depends upon engineering knowledge from its datasets for
system level diagnostics to its expert system knowledge at the
vehicle level. This makes FAVER’s process more transparent
and trustworthy as against data-driven reasoning, paving way
for explainable AI in vehicle health reasoning.
EVALUATION CRITERIA 4: EASE OF IMPLEMENTATION
FAVER’s modular structure enables the integration of any
type of simulation model and diagnostic functions into
the framework. In contrast, the neural network can accept
only data-driven inputs for its reasoning process. Besides,
the process of adding a new fault or new system into the
database is more straightforward in FAVER when compared
to data-driven reasoning, where every change requires care-
ful consideration for readjusting its datasets. With FAVER’s
architecture, any type of systems DT modeled at any scale
and diagnostics with any level of granularities developed
by different engineers can be brought in the framework for
the investigation of vehicle level health. This is simply not
possible with any type of data driven reasoning.
To summarise, while FAVER’s reasoning is not 100%
accurate for isolating the root causes and predicting cascading
effects, but its significant advantage lies in its modularity.
Encapsulation of the DTs and the novel knowledge base
of FAVER’s expert system enable FAVER to be flexible
and scalable. While the neural network has provided very
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accurate results and has better performance, it requires care-
fully curated datasets representing the fault scenarios, which
consumes more time and effort for every new addition to
its structure. In practice, FAVER has the advantage due
to its transparency over the neural network’s black box
approach in making inferences. The results produced by
FAVER can be used directly by the maintainers, as they are
clearly explainable and show the routes for troubleshooting.
Whereas, the neural network can produce only the results,
from which, the maintainers will not have the knowledge
of how the fault occurred or why the action is needed, and
the interpreting process creates more time-consuming work
during maintenance. Besides, it can be seen from the case
study that the neural network required 3X more number of
parameters, which wouldmake it difficult for implementation
by the aircraft manufacturers, whereas, FAVER’s requirement
of less number of sensors to produce explainable results for
maintainers provides it with an added advantage towards the
ease of implementation in the future.
2) PROGNOSTIC COVERAGE
Similar to diagnostic coverage, a reasoner can either be
evaluated for its effectiveness in predicting scenarios that
cannot be predicted by other existing approaches or it can
be evaluated for the improvement in accuracy, precision, and
sensitivity when compared to the existing approaches [33].
Currently, FAVER does not carry out traditional remaining
useful life prediction for the systems, to be compared with
existing approaches. Instead, in the presence of an interacting
fault in an aircraft system, FAVER’s reasoning predicts the
cascading effect on the system’s interaction network, if the
fault propagation continues. From the use cases demonstrated
in the previous sections, it can be seen that FAVER’s reason-
ing is capable of predicting the potential cascading effects
effectively.
Latency in making inferences is not used to evaluate
FAVER currently, as FAVER’s reasoning is not tested on
datasets with timestamps. Similarly, sensitivity to different
faults and degradations are also not evaluated, as degrada-
tions of faults are not included in the analysis in the current
stage.
VI. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORKS
To summarise, the following contributions are made in this
paper.
i) The working concept behind FAVER’s framework,
its requirements, architecture, and the previous work
done to set up the framework for the demonstrations
have been described.
ii) The strength of FAVER’s architecture is demonstrated
on three fronts:
a. The ability to accommodate different types of
representations of system DTs and diagnostics.
b. The ability to expand to include new faults to the
systems with minimal change to the framework
by adding additional faults to two systems.
c. The ability to expand the framework to include
a new system with minimal change to the frame-
work is demonstrated using four aircraft sys-
tems: i) the EPS, ii) the FS, iii) the Engine, and
iv) the ECS.
iii) Real aircraft incidents are adapted for use case sce-
narios, and FAVER’s ability to isolate faults for single
faults, interaction faults and to resolve ambiguity are
tested.
iv) Evaluation of FAVER is carried out in two stages:
a. The advantages and disadvantages of using
FAVER’s reasoning are demonstrated with
examples.
b. FAVER’s reasoning and data-driven reasoning
(neural networks) are compared, and the pros
and cons are discussed.
The framework is currently in its initial stage of isolating
faults, identifying root causes, and cascading effects with a
basic set of assumptions. FAVER can be further expanded
by adding multi-physical systems like avionics, landing gear,
and controls. False alarms and incorrect sensor readings,
as well as unsteady state scenarios, can also be investigated.
Also, FAVER can be upgraded to include the degradation lev-
els of faults while reasoning at both system and vehicle levels.
The results of FAVER will be adapted to OSA-CBM stan-
dards for its future applications in industry. While FAVER’s
expert system helps maintain its trustworthiness and trans-
parency, a hybrid of expert systems with data-driven methods
can increase the dependency of its knowledge base and derive
more information from existing data, rather than relying only
on experts. With its unique features and robust framework,
FAVER opens many avenues for further exploration in vehi-
cle level health reasoning for IVHM systems.
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